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the contracts of its promoters. The rule is just and should not
be weakened.""'
Nevertheless we feel Mr. Isaacs is correct when he advocates that
a corporation need not come into existence free of all contracts but that
by statute, after a certain point is reached, the corporation can succeed
the promoter. The promoter who purports to act for the corporation
should be labeled or registered, and the scope of his power should be
strictly defined. But within that scope he should be able to bind the
corporation. Protection against misrepresentation could be afforded
the public and the future stockholders of the corporation by statutory
provision for administrative control of promotion and extension of
"blue sky" provisions to such contracts. In this way the responsibility
on these pre-incorporation contracts, which vitally affect the value of
the stock of the corporation that is later formed, will be clearly defined
instead of being subject to twilight zone reasoning of the courts in try-
ing to find corporate ratification or adoption.
JOHN F. ZIMMERMANN
Domestic Relations-General Statute of Limitation as Bar to Divorce
Action - Plaintiff, husband, and defendant, wife, intermarried on the
8th day of May, 1926. Since 1932 the defendant has been an inmate of
an asylum for the insane. The plaintiff alleges that from the time of the
marriage until the time that defendant was committed, she had been
guilty of a course of cruel and inhuman treatment toward him. Defen-
dant demurred on the ground that the action was barred by the general
statute of limitation.' This statute provides that where an action was
cognizable by a court of chancery on or before Feb. 28, 1857, and no
other statute of limitation applies to it, it must be brought within ten
years. The order sustaining the demurrer was affirmed. Held: the juris-
diction of the court over divorce being purely statutory and an action of
divorce being cognizable in a court of chancery prior to 1857, the general
statute of limitation stands in bar of this divorce action since it was not
brought within ten years. Zlindra v. Zlindra, 252 Wis. 606, 32 N. W. (2d)
656 (1948).
The application of a general statute of limitation to a divorce ac-
tion is not a new one. The case at hand is novel inasmuch as it is the
first case in Wisconsin which has allowed the general statute to bar a
divorce action. Textwriters are almost unanimous in their declaration
that a general statute of limitation cannot bar such an action.
"Statutes of limitation in the mere ordinary words common in
our states, are not extended to suits for divorce."
2
"Park v. Modern Woodmen, 181 II. 214, 54 N.E. 932, 938 (1899).
'Wis. Stat. (1947), 330.14, 330.18(4).
22 Bishop, Marriage, Divorce and Separation 426.
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The reason for this view is clear when one examines the early cases
on the subject. Where a divorce was sought on the ground of desertion,
a Georgia court ruled that although the action had not been brought
within the period prescribed by the general statute of limitation, that
statute could not be presented in bar.3 The reasoning of the court
was that since divorce suits were originally tried in ecclesiastical courts,
mere statutory provisions could not reach them. The court then found
its precedent in English cases. Furthermore, in 1881, more courts in-
clined to the view that contracts of marriage were not like other con-
tracts, and the notion was prevalent that to make of the marriage con-
tract a thing merely statutory was to deny it its dignity in the three-
fold relationship of man, the state and God. Hence, the courts of that
era found it easy to confine actions for divorce to equitable rules.
In a Utah case," the wife suffered cruelty sufficient to have war-
ranted divorce. A year after the marriage the parties obtained a
"church divorce" which was merely an agreement between the parties,
witnessed by their church, to the effect that they would no longer con-
tinue in the married state. Plaintiff wife "remarried" but upon dis-
covery that she was still married to the defendant, the parties to the
second ceremony separated. She brought her suit for divorce after
the statutory period had run but the court overruled a demurrer based
upon a general statute of limitation. While this decision has been cited
in the Zlindra case5 in support of the old rule, the dicta in the Utah
cases clearly indicate that the court felt that a change in the rule
might be forthcoming, for it was careful to limit its decision to the
facts of the case. It then went on to say that a lapse of time alone
might be sufficient to bar an action of divorce.
At the turn of the century the change in thought began to manifest
itself in the courts of other states. In 1905 an Iowa court held that a
general statute of limitation would act as a bar in an action on a con-
tract between a husband and wife.7 In 1906, a Kansas court held that
the general statute of limitation of that state did not apply to divorce
actionsa but that decision did not effect the New York courts when,
seven years later, they expressed the strong view on the matter which
they maintain today. Under the law of New York there is a fixed
limitation for every cause of action whether legal or equitable., This
case rendered obsolete, at least in New York, the theory that a purely
equitable action could be barred only under the doctrine of laches. It
3Mosely v. Mosely, 67 Ga. 92 (1881).
4Tufts v. Tufts, 16 L.R.A. 482, 8 Utah 142 (1892).5 Zlindta v. Zlindra, 32 N.W. (2d) 656, Wisconsin (1948).
'Fn. 4, supra.
7In re Deaner, 126 Ia. 701, 102 N.W. 825 (1905).
8 Cullison v. Cullison, 73 Kan. 281, 85 P. 289 (1906).
9 Sturm v. Sturm, 141 N.Y.S. 61, 80 Misc. 277 (1913).
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held that a general ten year statute of limitation applies to an action
for divorce for cruelty. North Carolina, in 1924, showed signs of
changing to the thinking of the New York courts when it was said
in a case that if a divorce action could be barred at all byr a statute of
limitation, it would be by the general statute.10 The more recent de-
cisions come largely from New York and hold that in cases of separa-
tion the general statute of limitation will act as a bar."
From the foregoing it is clear that Wisconsin has fallen in with
the recent trend. However, the court in its decision in the Zlindra case12
did not merely follow precedent for it arrived at its conclusion entirely
by its own reasoning. The court traces the statutory history of divorce
actions in this state. The statutes of 1849 conferred upon the circuit
courts of the state jurisdiction over divorce cases.' When the general
statute of limitation was rewritten in 1878, the Revisors said specifically
that it was to apply to all actions including those which were formerly
cognizable only in a court of chancery. Thus a divorce action, which
was cognizable only in a court of chancery prior to 1849, was clearly
within the intent of the legislators when they rewrote the general
statute of limitation after having given statutory jurisdiction over di-
vorce actions to the circuit courts.
In view of the fact that divorce actions traditionally have been
brought in courts of equity, the question arises as to why the doctrine
of laches was not invoked in the principal case.'4 This may be because
it is doubtful that the action could have been barred under the doctrine.
One textwriter says of the doctrine of laches that it is an instance of
the exercise of the reserved power of equity to withhold relief other-
wise regularly given where in the particular case the granting of such
relief would be unfair and unjust.14 The essential aspect of laches is
that where, during a lapse of time, there has been a change of position
of one of the parties such as would make the granting of relief work
an unjust hardship, the court of equity will not grant that relief. In
the principal case the defendant was committed to an asylum for the
insane and, being in that condition, the granting of the divorce would
hardly have imposed upon her an unjust hardship. Therefore, if the
action were to be barred at all in Wisconsin it would have to be barred
10 Garris v. Garris, 188 N.C. 321, 124 S.E. 314 (1924).
"Guerin v. Guerin, 217 N.Y.S. 1, 127 Misc. 745 (1926); Hunt v. Hunt, 273
N.Y.S. 194, 152 Misc. 364 (1934); Rothman v. Rothman, 67 N.Y.S.(2d) 96(1946).
Fn. 5, supra.
'sWis. Stat. (1849), Chap. 79, sec. 8.
'4 "It seems that while actions for divorce are not barred by the general statutes
of limitation, still laches in suing for relief may justify the court in denying
relief and dismissing the proceedings. . . ." 9 R.C.L. 169.
'
5 Walsh, A Treatise on Equity, Callaghan and Company, (National Textbook
Series, 1930).
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strictly because of the lapse of time. In view of the fact that the
doctrine of laches probably would not apply, the only bar based purely
on lapse of time applicable to divorce actions would be the general
statute of limitation.
Up to this point this discussion has been confined to the subject
of barring divorce actions solely on the basis of general statutes of
limitation. To avoid confusion it should be pointed out that statutes
of a slightly different type have been held to bar such actions in a
number of cases. These statutes, however, are not general but are de-
signed to limit the time within which divorce actions based upon cer-
tain grounds such as cruelty and adultery may be brought. As such
they are specific statutes of limitation and operate the same as do other
specific statutes. These statuies operate absolutely, leaving no discre-
tion in the court, and they need not be pleaded in defense., Wisconsin
does not have such legislation and hence the only statute that could
possibly be applied in the principal case is the general one, upon which
the demurrer was based.
Whether or not annulment actions will be treated in the same man-
ner as actions for divorce is doubtful. Although no cases have been
found on the subject, it would seem that there is no reason why the
doctrine of the principal case should not be extended to include some
actions for annulment. Where a plaintiff has not ratified a voidable
marriage and yet has failed to bring an action for a period in excess of
ten years, it seems reasonable that he, too, would be barred from bring-
ing his action for annulment. On the other hand, where the marriage
was void ab initio the defendant will probably not be allowed, by plead-
ing the general statute, to render that valid which was void from its
inception.
RICHARD F. HOFFMAN
Is Fn. 2, supra.
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